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INTRODUCTION
Evidence in anthropology is an issue of knowledge 
power; it interrogates the value of fieldwork expe-
rience and anthropological analysis as evidence in 
scholarship and politics. Here, I want to focus on how 
our interlocutors and companions in the field present 
their lived experience and how they construct shared 
experience as evidence of a particular situation and 
as argument for a particular kind of political and eco-
nomic transformation.
To do so, I will use various vignettes from my field-
work in Ferrol, an industrial town in Galicia (north 
Western Spain) during the post-2008 economic reces-
sion. My aim here is to contrast the expression of a 
particular kind of popular or “vernacular” knowledge 
based on experience with the “expert” knowledge, 
mostly based on quantitative data and mathematic 
modelling, that has justified policies of austerity.  The 
questions I pose are of method: how are we, as an-
thropologist, going to deal with these diverse fields of 
knowledge? What is the truth-claims and truth-value 
of experience-based knowledge and what arguments 
for action does it support? How should we value po-
tentially incommensurable forms of evidence?
The initial section explores how various anthropol-
ogists have dealt with the question of evidence by in-
terrogating the value of fieldwork experience and the 
knowledge it produces. It is followed by a presenta-
tion of how particular logics and knowledge claims 
are produced as evidence in the field and provide 
arguments for action. This section is based on inter-
mittent fieldwork I have conducted in Ferrol between 
2010-2015 embedded in a long term ethnography in-
itiated in 2004. A third section examines the academ-
ic debate that questions the value of experience for 
providing historical evidence. Here the complexity of 
historical truth emerges as authors engage with the 
material, social and emotional entanglements of lived 
reality. To conclude, the article develops the concepts 
of “factual truth” and “social facts” as flying buttress-
es supporting experience as evidence in vernacular 
knowledge arguments leading to action.
FIELDWORK, EXPERIENCE AND EVIDENCE
Anthropologists’ preoccupation with “evidence” 
refers to the questioning of fieldwork as an experi-
ence, and of the authority of the ethnography as a 
faithful representation of social life (Asad 1994; Has-
trup 2004; Engelke 2008; Borneman and Hammoudi 
2009). With some exceptions in the area of applied, 
public or policy oriented anthropology (Liebow et al. 
2013), the debate responds to epistemological issues. 
Talal Asad (1994), for example, compares the emer-
gence of fieldwork as the central tool of anthropolog-
ical research to the emergence of statistics as a tool 
of political administration and intervention showing 
the issues of scale and power that need to be taken 
into account in anthropological research. Fieldwork 
experience, he reports, went from an initial meaning 
derived from the natural sciences where it was “close 
to the idea of laboratory experimentation” (Asad 
1994: 60) to a meaning stressing “the ethnographer’s 
living experience” representing “social life as a real, 
experiential whole” (Asad 1994: 61). Analysis of this 
experience could yield “social types” in the attempt 
to theorize recurrence as social structure, but these 
types were not akin to the “representative samples” 
of statistics. Indeed, statistics became a tool not only 
for “representing” social life but also for “construct-
ing” it (Asad 1994: 70). As such, the statistical meth-
od, its categories and the data it produces are not so 
much inscriptions of social reality but interventions 
in and creation of that reality. Asad, then, does not 
reject the kind of knowledge that fieldwork experi-
ence elicits but he underscores the need to expand 
anthropological tools to include an analysis of the 
“strong language” of statistics as it is used for political 
interventions and struggles alike (1994: 78-79). Kirst-
en Hastrup in 2004 focuses on the anthropologists’ 
work, and in particular, on ethnographic experience 
as producing a kind of evidence that is not “external” 
to the object of study but leads to a valuable form 
of understanding. Matthew Engelke in 2008 makes a 
thorough review of the methodological and episte-
mological questions that anthropologists have raised 
—often implicitly— around the issue of the argumen-
tative value of fieldwork experience and anthropolog-
ical analysis as evidence in scholarship and politics. 
Political value is also what moves Borneman and 
Hammoudi (2009: 20) to “reconceptualize the re-
lation between observation, experience and rep-
resentation as one of dialectical objectification” that 
underlines the “possibilities of sharing experience 
that lead to objectivity-in-progress and to interpre-
tations that might converge into historically situated 
propositions and double-edged critiques. Objectiv-
ities-in-progress are possible only if ethnographers 
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re-establish a critical distance from the people and 
processes they study”. This position introduces the 
dialectical nature of ethnographic evidence-making 
during fieldwork as an ongoing sharing of experi-
ence, interpretation, and critique between ethnogra-
pher and collaborators in the field. The situatedness 
of interlocutors in historically woven global and local 
geometries of power is recognized as contributing 
to the categories for experiencing and understand-
ing, yet the possibility of producing ethnographic ac-
counts that hold truth-value and comparative worth 
about the people and places studied is validated by 
the epistemological break that allows the process of 
dialectical objectification. As I understand it, Borne-
man and Hammoudi’s position expands the concept 
of “participant objectivation” that Bourdieu (2003) 
developed for the researcher to become aware of 
his personal experience as distinct from the object 
of research. With “dialectical objectification” —un-
like Bourdieu’s assertion that the people observed 
in the ethnographic encounter “do not have in their 
heads the scientific truth of their practice which I am 
trying to extract from observation of their practice” 
(Bourdieu 2003: 288)—both parties to the encoun-
ter have a stake in proposing truth-value claims as 
valuable knowledge. Beyond the value of fieldwork 
experience and the ethnographic account, then, this 
poses the question of the knowledge value of the 
reflexive logics of objectification that the people we 
interact and debate with in the field apply to their 
experience when analyzing it. How can the problem-
atics they define and the theories they elaborate to 
answer them be engaged with as reasonings of value 
in the field of economic and political knowledge? 
These questions seem important because Southern 
Europe’s post-2008 recession has had significant po-
litical outcomes that rest their force on alleged factual 
explanations of different kinds. Indeed, those sectors 
of the population whose expectations of security and 
stability are now faltering use their experience of 
declining material wellbeing and social worth as evi-
dence for claiming radical political transformations (of 
different kinds along a wide spectrum of political ide-
ologies). In this process they often contradict the “ex-
pert” evidence used to justify structural adjustment 
policies. At the same time, expert evidence itself is 
not consistent. One the one hand, economists, soci-
ologists and political scientists who provide the main 
scholarly arguments for public policy provide differ-
ent evidence or use the evidence to claim different 
things, according to their methodological, theoretical 
and political frameworks and objectives. This was the 
case, for example, during the Greek sovereign debt 
crisis when the Syriza governments before and after 
the Referendum of 2015 were guided respectively by 
Varoufakis and Tsakalotos. As two expert economists 
that came from a similar tradition in the left they nev-
ertheless increasingly diverged in their analysis and 
advice as they confronted other experts’ theories and 
policies (such as Schauble’s or Dijsselbloem’s) during 
their endless negotiations in the Eurogroup meetings. 
On the other hand, even within the same framework, 
say that of the International Monetary Fund, pow-
erful experts and policy advisors often contradict 
themselves: For example, they support or decry fis-
cal consolidation and are ambivalent about its results 
(Kentikelenis, Stubbs and King 2016).2 What I wish to 
focus on, however, is on experience as a kind of evi-
dence and on its value as a knowledge argument for 
change, as confronted with other –mostly quantita-
tive—forms of evidence that guide policy.
I suggest that facts of power, aimed at systemic so-
cial reproduction, explain the lack of social relevance 
of some life experiences and conceptual logics about 
livelihood, wealth accumulation, and domination 
processes. These powerless voices, then, often get 
“translated” into some authoritative “expert” mod-
el –through statistics, the media, or mediators such 
as the anthropologist or sociologist doing fieldwork 
and writing theories. As Briggs (2004:177) has point-
ed out for the political economy of public discourse 
in explanations of a cholera epidemic in Venezuela, 
the participation of indigenous people “in public dis-
course is thus citational, as captured by reporters’ 
questions and photographs”. We have seen a similar 
use of references to ordinary people’s accounts in 
the media in terms of their affective content during 
the Great Recession in Spain rather than in terms of 
their analytical value. In this process experience gets 
co-opted as an illustration within a different domain 
of discursive authority (Brenneis 1988). The argu-
ment I will develop here is that shared “experience” 
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is constitutive both of “factual truth” and of “social 
facts”, two distinct yet similar concepts of the so-
cial sciences, and as such it can contribute valuable 
knowledge and become evidence supporting argu-
ments for political action.
EXPERIENCE AS EVIDENCE IN ACTION
I started fieldwork in the town of Ferrol in Galicia 
(NW Spain) in 2004, well before the 2008 financial cri-
sis, at a time when jobs in industry were dwindling but 
other employment, mainly in services and construc-
tion, was available. The town grew in the 18th centu-
ry around a shipyard for the Navy and developed an 
industrial vocation with a strong union movement. In 
the second half of the 20th century the re-structuring 
of the shipyards resulted in high unemployment, ear-
ly retirement and a shift to service sector unskilled 
jobs (mostly female) and construction related work 
(mostly male). Easy credit resulting from the Europe-
an Monetary Union and the euro fueled consumption 
at the turn of the century, however. When the Span-
ish housing bubble burst following the financial crisis, 
unemployment hit record highs, credit dried out, and 
mortgage foreclosures became an impending menace 
for many. Austerity measures defunded public servic-
es and constrained benefits, making it very difficult 
for many people to get by without the help of older 
kin, charity and solidarity networks (Narotzky 2016). 
The period I will analyze refers to the post-2008 mo-
ment, especially from 2010 on, after the banking cri-
sis exploded in Spain. 
I will present here several propositions that encap-
sulate my interlocutors’ construction of experience 
as evidence and the claims for redress or reparations 
that this evidence supports. The evidence is based on 
shared experience that describes what they under-
stand as factual truth and that constitutes the foun-
dation for a political analysis that aims at mobilizing 
political action. It is evidence “of” a concrete reality 
affecting them, and evidence “for” calling a particular 
kind of action.
Starting in 2010 but increasingly during the period 
between 2012 and 2015 —when austerity measures 
were strongly felt—I encountered the proposition 
that [Austerity degrades and humiliates]. My inter-
locutors recurrently put forward as evidence their 
individual and collectively shared experience of un-
employment, deprivation, dispossession, state ne-
glect, disrespect, and dependence. These facts were 
embodied in their direct lived experience of dimin-
ishing income opportunities (and the experience of 
friends and family whom they observed and spoke to, 
as well as case stories that appeared in the media) 
that degraded their human worth. At the same time, 
the media printed official statistics of unemployment 
and other indices of diminishing quality of life, such 
as the housing foreclosure crisis. The coupling of ex-
perience and statistical information was constructed 
as sufficient evidence of the effects of the financial 
crisis and its handling by authorities through the im-
position of austerity measures. This verbalized evi-
dence of produced experience as “truth claims” that 
constituted the foundation for calls to action. Most 
calls to action referred to different forms of “solidari-
ty” underlining the connection between shared expe-
rience and collective mobilization. The action call was 
also based on experience and produced evidence for; 
it could be analytically summarized in the proposition 
[Solidarity against austerity will bring dignity]. Let me 
now present María’s story gathered in 2013. 
María is a young divorced mother of two teenage 
children. She lost her home through forced eviction 
because she could not pay the mortgage after be-
coming unemployed; she went back to her parents’ 
apartment with her two children. She speaks of the 
pressure it put on her parents’ lives and on their re-
tirement pension and she wonders how this family 
solidarity will be possible in the future, if the gov-
ernment reforms the public pension system: “I will 
never have a pension… I will never be able to do for 
my children what my parents are doing for me.” The 
experience of relying on her father’s modest pension 
for a living develops a logical argument: if the pension 
fails in the future, a crucial means of livelihood disap-
pears. She fears increased deprivation in the future 
because of austerity measures restructuring the pen-
sion system (Narotzky and Pusceddu 2020). Here, her 
experience of retirement public pensions as the main 
family income that allows family solidarity is evidence 
of the danger of destitution in the future.
Speaking about austerity cuts in public education 
María says: “I didn’t finish high school, but even 
I know that the teacher is teaching them crap. I go 
there and tell the teachers ‘are you kidding me? My 
children don’t even know the basics!’” She attributes 
this neglect to a conspiratorial strategy that aims to 
render working class children unskilled, useless, and 
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pushed out to the margins of the labor force. Briggs 
(2004) has analyzed how conspiratorial theories can 
be interpreted as struggles aimed at debunking offi-
cial regimes of truth in an unequal field of commu-
nication. For María, educational deterioration is a 
process that voids the substance of liberal citizenship. 
Her experience of state neglect in education is evi-
dence of an ongoing process of political destitution.
María stresses the need to keep self-respect and 
dignity; she says: “People have to know that you still 
have dignity, that you still merit the respect of every-
one around you, even in the worst situation. When 
your situation is bad and you are suffering from it, 
you can truly understand others coming from similar 
experiences. You feel useful [in solidarity action] be-
cause you collaborate, you participate with people 
who understand the situation, who give you alterna-
tives, give you information. And you feel capable… 
all this helps you as a person (…) there are people 
there [in solidarity groups] who will support you, 
who will make you feel good”. Here a similar expe-
rience of suffering is evidence of better understand-
ing, support, and respect, which in turn is evidence 
for the call to solidarity. 
At a collective scale also, solidarity and activism are 
grounded on the experience of shared suffering and 
a mutual understanding of the causes that produce 
it.  The evidence produced by this shared experience 
supports a moral critique of the collusion of state and 
capital in depriving people from their livelihood and 
their dignity and, thus, from their humanity. Stating 
claims for redress in moral terms, makes sense in a 
context where both political and economic institu-
tions are viewed as liars and deceivers for not provid-
ing the wellbeing they promised. The evidence pre-
sented constructs moral degradation of institutions 
–in particular austerity measures and collusion with 
the financial sector—as the cause for loss of dignity. 
Claims then are framed in institutional obligations 
constructed as eminently moral. They address the 
pledge to care, highlighting the breakdown of social 
reproduction.
In the mobilizations, people speak of “dignity” as 
attached to universal social rights and equal access 
to public services, and vindicate it as a “conquest” 
of past working class struggles. To claim dignity is 
to be recognized as having an equally meaningful 
social position in society. Recognition expresses par-
ticipation in a social and political community where 
individuals hold a valued place as members of an in-
terdependent whole. It is the means to acquire per-
sonal worth, while simultaneously creating worth 
for the collective. Here, the shared experience of 
deprivation of citizenship rights is evidence of a lack 
of recognition and respect on the part of govern-
ment institutions, and evidence of social destitution. 
Activists mobilize this evidence as justification for 
reclaiming dignity, through claiming their constitu-
tional and human rights.
On June 2, 2013, activist artist-citizens of this indus-
trial town in Galicia organized a performance installa-
tion where they hung all kinds of personal garments 
on the gates of the shipyards.  On the main entrance 
they displayed a banner with the phrase “Carga de 
Dignidad” (Dignity load) referring to the workers’ 
slogan “Carga de trabajo” (Work load) in demand 
for new contracts to the shipyards. This action high-
lighted the connection between work and dignity; it 
expressed how dignity is tied to work in the everyday 
experience of people in this part of the world. For the 
activists, the   shared experience of lack of work and 
of livelihood opportunities was presented as evidence 
of market failure, it was also evidence of the fact that 
work and dignity are linked and, ultimately, it justified 
claiming work and dignity together, as a right to life.
A few days later, on June 12, a representative of 
the Confederación Intersindical Galega, the regional 
union, claimed that 120,000 had rallied in the town 
in a massive union organized demand for work. He 
added “É unha manifestación da dignidade, porque 
digno é o dereito a traballar e vivir na nosa terra” (It is 
a demonstration of/for dignity, because dignity is our 
right to work and live in our land) (Couce 2013). This 
sentence of a union leader in a labor demonstration 
expresses the intricate weaving of dignity with the 
right to work and a life in the homeland. The massive 
demonstration is also material evidence that people 
support this argument of dignity linked to work based 
on shared experience and collective understanding.
Dignity is also the cry that drove people all over 
Spain in what was defined as “Mareas” (tides) in sup-
port of public services in the face of austerity cuts 
and privatization: Marea Blanca-Sanidad (White Tide-
Health), Marea Verde-Educación (Green Tide-Educa-
tion) and the Marea de Pensionistas (the Pensioners’ 
tide). Tides were extremely important mobilizing 
forces during the years 2011-2013, and the White 
Tide mobilizations in Madrid in 2013 stopped at the 
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time the autonomous community of Madrid’s plan to 
privatize public health services, in what many viewed 
as the victory of a broad-based citizen movement. 
These social movements expressed the shared expe-
rience of diminishing public support for health, ed-
ucation, and the public pension system. Tides were 
clearly targeting austerity cutbacks in public services. 
The metaphor of the tide is telling; it signifies some-
thing that cannot be stopped, with immanent ener-
gy, a rising tide, an expanding movement, a natural 
force. These tides rise from the natural force provid-
ed by the “event structure” of austerity. Tides are 
evidence of a collective unstoppable and expanding 
social movement, and evidence for the justified claim 
against austerity and privatization.
Tides gave way to the “Marchas de la dignidad” 
(Marches for Dignity). Here dignity was a call to con-
verge around the general claim for basic constitu-
tional and human rights that lawmakers and political 
institutions recurrently disregarded. The motive of 
political destitution voiced by María in 2013 was very 
central to the mobilizations. The mobilization went 
to the core of the everyday experience of austerity. 
The “Marchas de la dignidad” converged in Madrid 
on March 22, 2014 (22-M), and gathered according 
to different sources a total of between 50,000 and 
2,500,000 people from different regions of Spain. 
Under the slogan “Pan, trabajo, techo y dignidad” 
(Bread, Work, a Roof, and Dignity) the marches pro-
tested against the experienced effect of the combina-
tion of recession and austerity measures as a result of 
the bailing out of an overleveraged banking system: 
job loss, mortgage foreclosures, food scarcity, and po-
litical destitution. Here, activists used people’s expe-
rience of unemployment, food deprivation, foreclo-
sures and the growing housing crisis as evidence for 
claiming the state’s responsibility to uphold human 
and constitutional rights.
Tides and marches both underline “dignity” (recog-
nition, social worth) as the central claim that encap-
sulates the limits beyond which the “system” is ex-
perienced as intolerable. Bread, Work and a Roof are 
all tied to basic livelihood and express social repro-
duction at the immediate level of bodies, households, 
and families. Their absence or deficient provisioning 
are immediate experiences that are intimate but also 
public, social and shared. “Work” is a claim to access 
a means of livelihood but also to retain autonomy 
through earned income, and agency through “doing”. 
Similarly, the claims for “bread” and “a roof” focus on 
immediate social reproduction while pointing at the 
foundations of social inclusion (as opposed to desti-
tute poverty and homelessness). The tides also refer 
to past experience, as public goods are the result of a 
past of collective struggles that are now under attack: 
public provisioning of quality health care, education, 
pensions and public services.  This past experience of 
struggle is folded into the present experience of dep-
rivation and understood as a form of dispossession.
Experience here produces the evidence of factu-
al truth claims. Experience is the evidence base for 
calls to action. Experience when shared is reflexive 
and analyzed, it produces a logic, a reasonable form 
of knowledge that struggles for value and authority 
(Briggs 2004; Brenneis 1988).
EXPERIENCE AS EVIDENCE: THE ACADEMIC 
DEBATE
In 1991, historian Joan Scott wrote an article on 
“The Evidence of Experience”. Taking the perspective 
of the “linguistic turn” she engaged in a strong critique 
of social scientists that depended on “experience” as 
evidence of difference. She was mostly addressing 
scholars that relied on accounts of experience of gen-
erally marginalized groups “women”, “black”, “homo-
sexual”, or “working class” to challenge mainstream 
accounts of historical processes. In her view, this 
methodological position expressed the weaknesses 
of empiricism, with its primordial reference to a “real” 
world outside of discourse, and as a corollary was 
blind to the discursively constructed categories that 
framed any kind of experience. “When the evidence 
offered is the evidence of ‘experience’, the claim for 
referentiality is further buttressed –what could be 
truer, after all, than a subject’s own account of what 
he or she has lived through? It is precisely this kind 
of appeal to experience as incontestable evidence and 
as an originary point of explanation –as a foundation 
on which analysis is based—that weakens the critical 
thrust of histories of difference” (1991: 777, empha-
sis added). Scott was rightly preoccupied with the 
seemingly pre-given aspect of identity categories that 
experiential accounts proposed and she underscored 
the need to historicize the categories that informed 
experience.
 Her article provoked a heated debate but was 
mostly critiqued on political grounds that stressed the 
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value of sharing individual embodied experience in 
order to connect it with a wider problem, eventually 
empowering and creating the conditions of possibility 
for active solidarity and resistance (Kruks 2001: 139). 
These authors were far from naïve empiricists. Rath-
er, they pointed at “the need to listen to such voices” 
(Pickering 1997: 212) and at how women’s personal 
narratives, for example, had the potential of unsettling 
and challenging hegemonic frameworks of meaning. 
“Women had something very real to complain about: 
if we assign no truth claims to their words, concepts 
such as oppression are rendered more opaque, less 
meaningful” (Sangster 2011: 158). These authors vin-
dicated the value of experience as evidence as a ne-
cessity of political analysis and subversive agency. On 
the one hand, they recuperated the referential aspect 
of experience narratives as a valid instrument for un-
derstanding the oppressive nature of social relations 
as well as of discursive constructions that contribute 
to misrepresent them. On the other hand, they as-
serted the centrality that sharing individual experi-
ences had for objectivizing similarities and producing 
solidarity and collective agency.
The debate had another –partially connected—ex-
pression within the field of Marxist historians and 
social scientists. Here the focus was on the tension 
between empiricism vs. theory on the one hand, 
and experience vs. structure on the other. Although 
E.P. Thompson became the main protagonist of this 
struggle with his attack of Althusser’s Marxist struc-
turalism in The Poverty of Theory (1978) there were 
other internal disputes in the field of Marxist histo-
rians that revolved around the value of experience 
both theoretically and politically (Thompson 1978, 
1981; Williams 1977, 1983; Samuel 1981; Hall 1981). 
Thompson understands the epistemology of the his-
torian as “two ‘dialogues’ out of which knowledge is 
formed: first, the dialogue between social being and 
social consciousness, which gives rise to experience; 
second, the dialogue between theoretical organi-
zation (in all its complexity) of evidence, on the one 
hand, and the determinate character of its object on 
the other”. (1978:32-33). At the same time, he is very 
clear about the objective of the historical discipline 
which is “the attainment of that history’s truth”. In his 
view historical change “actually occurred” and while 
historiography might misrepresent what happened, 
nothing can “modify the past’s ontological status” 
(1978: 40). History’s truth, then, is close to what 
Arendt (1967) defines as factual truth, an elusive re-
ality that nevertheless should guide both the histori-
an’s work and political debate. And experience, the 
weaving of moral values and material facts (Thomp-
son 1978: 175) opens the door to a new form of the-
orization (1978: 167-8). Moreover, he maintains that 
“experience has, in the last instance, been generated 
in ‘material life’” (1978: 171) thereby resting social 
consciousness in the materiality of social existence 
and processes. 
In a further clarification of the concept of “experi-
ence” Thompson introduced a distinction between 
“social consciousness” –what he defined as “experi-
ence II”—and “lived experience” –defined as “expe-
rience I”, where “experience” lies “half within social 
being, half within social consciousness” (Thompson 
1981: 405-6). With this, his concept of experience 
moves close to Raymond Williams “structures of feel-
ing” (1978). In his seminal piece, Williams describes 
“practical consciousness” as “what is actually being 
lived, and not only what is thought is being lived (…) a 
kind of feeling and thinking which is indeed social and 
material, but each in an embryonic phase before it 
can become fully articulate (…) a particular quality of 
social experience” (1978: 131). These are qualitative 
changes that “do not have to await definition, classi-
fication, or rationalization before they exert palpable 
pressures and set effective limits on experience and 
on action. Such changes can be defined as changes in 
structures of feeling” (1978: 132). 
When trying to define “experience” in his revised 
version of Keywords, however, Williams distinguishes 
“experience past”, lessons of experience as opposed 
to innovations, and “experience present”, the full and 
active awareness that captures the whole conscious-
ness and the whole being. This last form –of which 
aesthetic and religious expressions are paramount 
examples— offers experiences “not only as truths, 
but as the more authentic kinds of truths” (Williams 
1985: 90). Without resolving the dialectics between 
both kinds of experience as he tries to do with “struc-
tures of feeling”, he notes here that they are con-
nected and introduces the meaning of “accumulated 
experience” as something that is consciously present 
as a reference, close in meaning to Thompson’s “so-
cial consciousness” or “experience II”. We could add 
that accumulated experience can exit the realm of full 
consciousness as in Bourdieu’s definition of “habitus” 
as embodied social and cultural dispositions that ex-
ert pressures towards the reproduction of a society 
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(Bourdieu 1980). What seems to emerge from this 
debate is a tension between an accumulation of ex-
perience, producing structures materially and morally 
constitutive of social consciousness, and an aware-
ness of being, of lived experiences, “experiences to 
which the fixed forms do not speak at all, which in-
deed they do not recognize” (Williams 1978: 130). 
Koselleck has addressed this complexity through his 
concept of “sediments of time” where he analytically 
distinguishes different layers of experience that un-
fold at different velocities. Similar to Braudel’s (1958) 
description of the various tempos of history, Kosel-
leck describes three main sediments of time, but he 
ties them directly to experience. Although he defines 
history as “the science of experience” (2018a: 4) we 
find him also debating with the problem of “historical 
reality” what Thompson described as the “ontological 
status” of the past. Indeed, “historical reality first con-
stitutes itself in between, before, or after the linguis-
tic articulations that target it” (Koselleck 2018b: 17). 
Linguistic testimonies are tied to specific situations 
that produce them yet, at another level, the “reali-
ty of history (…) is a product of linguistic possibilities, 
theoretical pre-givens, and methodological points of 
access that come together in a narrative of depic-
tion. The result is not a reproduction of past reality 
but instead (…) the fiction of the factual” (2018b: 20, 
emphasis added). I will return shortly to this fictional 
form of facticity but let me now get back to the lay-
ers of experience that Koselleck describes and in par-
ticular to the concept of “surprise” which appears to 
be close to those of “lived experience” and “practical 
consciousness” that we have encountered above. 
The dimension of experience defined as “singulari-
ty” emerges as a surprise from the backdrop of every-
day recurrent structures that express accumulated ex-
perience. “To experience a surprise means that some-
thing happened differently than one had thought. (…) 
The continuum between previous experience and the 
expectation of coming events is breached and needs 
to constitute itself anew.” (Koselleck 2018a: 7) But 
then, the craft of historians is to find the conditions 
of possibility of such singular events, that is, to find 
missed patterns that might explain what is experi-
enced as surprise (Koselleck 2018a: 7). Thompson 
catches this surprise aspect of experience in his fa-
mous quote: “Experience walks in without knocking 
at the door, and announces deaths, crises of subsist-
ence, trench warfare, unemployment, inflation, geno-
cide. People starve: their survivors think in new ways 
about the market. People are imprisoned: in prison 
they meditate in new ways about the law. In the face 
of such general experiences old conceptual systems 
may crumble and new problematics insist upon their 
presence” (Thompson 1978: 9). 
These general experiences of surprise are what 
Koselleck refers to as “event structures” when he 
describes the commonalities of situations such as 
trench warfare, which still come to consciousness 
through concrete combinations of personal cultural 
and social interpretive frameworks (Koselleck 2018c: 
208-9). Surprise disrupts routinized experience and 
embodied expectations and the shock pushes us to 
seek meaning to frame the singular experience in a 
narrative discourse. Following Dilthey, Victor Turner 
understands this process as one of relating the “pre-
occupying present experience” to “past experiences 
of similar potency” resulting in a relational structure 
that we call meaning (1986: 36), and this process is 
mostly one of communication: “experience pushes 
toward expression, or communication with others” 
(Ibid.: 37). Here we find the entanglement of various 
dimensions of experience —surprise, routine, accu-
mulated experience, and communication—into the 
sharing process that produced the evidence of factu-
al truth that Arendt posed as the bedrock of political 
debate. 
Arendt speaks of “factual information” although 
she stresses the testimonial aspect of the construc-
tion of factual truth. For her, “Factual truth (…) is al-
ways related to other people: it concerns events and 
circumstances in which many are involved; it is es-
tablished by witness and depends upon testimony; it 
exists only to the extent that it is spoken about, even 
if it occurs in the domain of privacy.” (1967: 52). The 
distinction between shared “experience” and “infor-
mation” is important, however, and revolves around 
the tension between Arendt’s factual truth and Dur-
kheim’s social facts, around subjective objectification 
and objective subjectification. Walter Benjamin in 
his piece The storyteller (1936) makes a clear differ-
ence between “storytelling” –the ability to exchange 
experiences—and information –events that are veri-
fiable, plausible and explanatory (2002 [1936]: 147). 
Storytelling is about sharing experience that is useful 
without recourse to explanation, it is about “counsel 
woven into the fabric of real life” in a recurrent man-
ner (Ibid.: 146). For Benjamin, after the First World 
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War communication of experience became almost 
impossible and, as a result, the wisdom embedded 
in storytelling –expressing the “epic side of truth”—
died out. The war shatters the communicability of 
experience: “Wasn’t it noticeable at the end of the 
war that men who returned from the battlefield had 
grown silent –not richer but poorer in communicable 
experience?” (Benjamin 2002: 143-4). The shock, the 
surprise of the war produces what Benjamin defines 
as “poverty of experience” that is, the inability to 
seek similar experiences in the past that may induce 
meaning. While this signs the death of the “epic side 
of truth” expressed in storytelling, it forces people “to 
start from scratch; to make a new start” (Benjamin 
2005 [1933]: 732). The poverty of experience thus 
leads to a potential ascetic renewal “beginning anew 
and with few resources” spearheaded by some crea-
tive individuals (Ibid.: 735). 
The breakdown of experience’s communicability 
emerges for Benjamin from what Koselleck describes 
as a collective experience framed in an event struc-
ture –trench war; it comes from the total absence of 
a framework of reference to speak about it and to 
weave it in an unfolding commonality of life. Story-
telling, then, gives way to information. Indeed, if, fol-
lowing Arendt, factual truth cannot emerge without 
communication of personal experience, still event 
structures can be ascertained through information 
of other kinds: material remains and structures, 
statistical data on populations, formal institutions, 
etc. Here Durkheim’s social facts appear as another 
factual dimension that provides a basis for interpre-
tation. Although social facts are constructed by the 
categories designed and selected by those managing 
the administration of populations (Desrosières 1993) 
so are narrative testimonies of experience subject to 
historically produced cultural categorical frameworks. 
Dealing with these two dimensions of facticity, one 
based on experience and shared narratives, the other 
based on institutional structures, material remains, 
documentary sources, and accounting categories of 
aggregation, the anthropologist can produce a form 
of historical realism akin to the reality of history that 
Koselleck’s defines as a “fiction of the factual”. 
The political power of Arendt’s definition of fac-
tual truth, however, rests on the evidence value of 
experience. Here, as anthropologists, we might con-
sider both the experience of our interlocutors and 
our own experience in and away from the field, as 
we share the coevalness of a globalized world with 
a hegemonic economic system. The point here is to 
elicit the evidence claims that people make and to 
understand how they mobilize this evidence in the 
struggle to transform the structures that frame their 
everyday lives.
CONCLUSION: KNOWLEDGE, EXPERIENCE AND 
FACTS
Hannah Arendt, in her classic piece on “Truth and 
Politics”, (1967) carefully examined the difference be-
tween “factual truth” and its interpretation in order 
to show the political danger of obliterating the dis-
tinction between truth and opinion. She said: “Free-
dom of opinion is a farce unless factual information 
is guaranteed and the facts themselves are not in 
dispute” (1967: 52). While political projects and ac-
tion rested on the interpretation of facts and on how 
to deal with them in order to change the world, they 
had to stand on the solid ground of factual truth. The 
social sciences, however, have long insisted on the 
social and cultural construction of the categories that 
are used to define and describe the “fact”. In this in-
tellectual context, then, can we think of experience as 
an expression of “factual truth”? Or should we under-
stand it rather as a “social fact”, an entity that emerg-
es from sociality but becomes a force external to it?
Durkheim’s concept of “social fact” is both different 
from and similar to Arendt’s “factual truth”. Factual 
truth arises from individual witnesses giving testimo-
ny and sharing their conscious knowledge of an ex-
perience (Arendt 1967: 52, 56). Social fact, instead, 
is a collective “thing” unintentionally resulting from 
human interaction; it then exercises an “exterior” 
pressure on the individual who may not be fully con-
scious of it (Durkheim 1967 [1894]). For Durkheim, 
institutions were the paradigmatic social fact, reflect-
ed in statistical patterns and correlations. Social facts 
would explain social processes in the manner of ex-
perimental science, without resorting to the “interi-
or” conscious knowledge that individual actors had of 
the course of events. To Arendt, individual experience 
and testimony as shared evidence—even if admit-
tedly unreliable—were central to the construction of 
factual truth. Instead, they were decried by Durkheim 
(1975 [1908]) as ineffective and often misleading for 
understanding social dynamics, structure, and causal-
ity. Both authors, however, spoke of the “stubborn-
ness” of facts—social facts and factual truth alike—a 
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quality of resistance to individual challenge and polit-
ical lie (Arendt 1967: 78; Durkheim 1967[1894]: 19). 
Here, I have addressed the tension between these 
two understandings of facts and their social and po-
litical dimensions as a struggle around experience, 
facts, evidence, and knowledge.
The ethnographic case I have presented reveals the 
tension between different forms of knowledge that 
confront each other (often implicitly) in a political 
struggle for truth. On the one hand, people define fac-
tual truth based on their shared experience of every-
day harshness under austerity. The collective aspect 
of the experience, constructed through continuous 
observation, reflexive analysis and putting in com-
mon individually experienced events through narra-
tives –the testimonial aspect that Arendt highlight-
ed—is constitutive of a particular kind of fact. On the 
other hand, the parameters and models that experts 
present as evidence justifying structural adjustment 
(other parameters and models being used for criti-
quing it) represent the kind of “external” forces that 
Durkheim would describe as social facts. Here, my fo-
cus has been on the kind of knowledge that ordinary 
lived experience produces and its value as evidence 
in political argument and struggle. I have addressed 
the tensions between experience, knowledge, and 
evidence in their connection with the production and 
challenge of particular fields of inequality. In parallel, I 
have presented the complex scholarly debate around 
the various dimensions and value of “experience” as 
pertaining to theorizations about “evidence” in social 
science’s production of knowledge.
Thinking about the value of knowledge that springs 
from long term communication with fieldwork par-
ticipants reveals how dependent on vernacular ex-
planations and practices our scholarly knowledge 
constructs are. It generally also exposes the reality 
of an epistemological break, a form of distancing, an 
involuntary objectification of our collaborators’ expe-
riences and understandings. Thus, our own fieldwork 
experience embodies the tension between factual 
truth and social facts even as it becomes the basis of 
most anthropological knowledge. 
While experience often produces a form of knowl-
edge that is deemed less valuable than the macroeco-
nomic abstract models allegedly guiding policy, it is a po-
tent mobilizing instrument based on facts, social forces, 
and argumentative logic. The testimony of experience 
challenges the authority of expert knowledge that gives 
arguments to the state for imposing its destructive solu-
tions “against all evidence”. In many of my interlocutors’ 
discourses, “politicians” —policymakers— are pictured 
as out of touch with ordinary people’s everyday reality 
(i.e. with their experience of deprivation and loss of en-
titlements): to them, it is clear that those in power fol-
low a personal agenda made evident through collusion 
and corruption linking high-ranking agents of govern-
ment, financial institutions, and “the rich”. Likewise, an 
increasingly precarized population perceives economic 
neoliberal “expert” knowledge, with its insistence on 
fiscal deficit control and the benefits of austerity for re-
balancing the budget, attracting investment, fostering 
growth and therefore wellbeing, as obviously wrong 
(i.e. incongruous with their real life experience). The fact 
that it retains enough knowledge authority in the eyes 
of policy makers —both in Spain and the European Un-
ion— is itself evidence of economic and political powers’ 
blatant disregard for ordinary people’s livelihoods and 
wellbeing. 
On reflection –and supported by all kinds of alter-
native readings—our interlocutors’ analyses view 
governments as hostage to a dominant school of 
economic thought (glossed over as neoliberal) that 
privileges corporative wealth’s interests and its rep-
resentatives and widens the gap of inequality. They 
counter with their collective experience as provid-
ing evidence of the failure of mainstream economic 
solutions and express this commonality of experience 
through many massive demonstrations apparently to 
no avail. However, in 2019, the stubbornness of this 
factual truth found its way to the final report of a par-
liamentary commission (Spain) investigating the man-
agement of the crisis by the financial actors and su-
pervisors: the report found them responsible for the 
“harm and suffering” inflicted to a majority of people 
with their policies.3 At this point, through official for-
3  Boletín General de las Cortes generales, Congreso de los Di-
putados, XII legislatura, Serie D: General, nº481, 17 de enero 
de 2019. Comisión de Investigación sobre la crisis financiera 
de España y el programa de asistencia financiera. Dictamen 





ver=S&movil=null> accessed February 25, 2020. The re-
port of the commission was validated by the Congress 
of Deputies <https://www.elperiodico.com/es/econo-
mia/20190228/congreso-aprobacion-informe-crisis-finan-
ciera-7329224>. Accessed: 25 Feb. 2020.
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malization, their experience was vindicated not only 
as factual truth but also as responding to social facts.
The kind of factual truth that our interlocutors 
provide with their testimonies is validated through 
shared embodied experience and practice in a par-
ticular social context, but it is also constructed in 
relation to other kinds of information that provides 
social facts. It aims at producing a framework of val-
uation different from the one that has provided the 
evidence for designing austerity policies. This factual 
truth expresses multiple scales of power and struggle, 
and underlines ambivalence and ambiguity even as it 
seeks to state common evidence. People tell their sto-
ries to each other, they read the paper or watch tele-
vision in a bar and comment the information provid-
ed (often statistical but also of other narrative voices) 
as they weave in their stories. They analyze and the-
orize; they debate with other more powerful forms 
of knowledge. The truth that emerges is complex and 
changing but it converges in simple truth-claim prop-
ositions that support collective mobilization. 
Evidence is always of / for something else; it re-
fers to a reality beyond discourse where individual 
and collective experience –with the categories that 
frame it discursively—are relationally produced in the 
struggle for the material and immaterial resources 
that make social life possible. Evidence emerges from 
experience, whether the direct embodied experience 
of factual truth shared through stories of testimony 
or the indirect disembodied experience that emerg-
es from recording instances of socially construct-
ed categories providing social facts. But evidence is 
also a knowledge argument for designing projects of 
change. Evidence is a will to assert a logical pattern: 
it is presented as proof leading to making a decision, 
the correct one or just the better decision, and taking 
action. As such, it is also a struggle for power, often a 
moral power that might reasonably ground a particu-
lar project of society. 
Analyzing the procedures of the South African 
Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC), headed 
by Desmond Tutu, Barbara Cassin (2014) proposes a 
reappraisal of the value of sophistic philosophy for 
a performative understanding of the truth as polit-
ically and pragmatically oriented. In her view “it is 
not an origin-truth, it is a result-truth. Nothing is 
already there… being is an effect of saying” (Cassin 
2014:269). Her position underlines political intent 
while refusing ontological status to the past, an as-
sertion that is only partially supported by her ap-
praisal of the truth dimensions elicited by the Com-
mission. Indeed, she explains that the TRC worked 
with four connected notions of truth, which are ex-
plicitly rhetorical notions: (1) “factual” or “forensic” 
truth, (2) “personal” and “narrative” truth, (3) “so-
cial” truth of a dialogue, a confrontation and, finally, 
(4) truth that “cures” and “restores”, “the truth at 
which one decides to stop, that which is enough for 
producing a consensus… to construct the rainbow 
nation” (Cassin 2014: 269-70). I find this analysis of 
pragmatic dimensions of truth useful even if I disa-
gree with the initial assertion that there is no reality 
beyond or without language. It represents a political 
viewpoint of the construction of factual truth –as 
Arendt understands it—and uses the sophistic rhe-
torical perspective to propose what I would describe 
as a weak form of referentiality: the objective is not 
to arrive at the “truth” as expression of an ontolog-
ical reality, but to attain “enough of the truth” for 
grounding the better political action. 
As anthropologists we are aware that evidence is 
constructed by using particular devices, defining sig-
nificant categories, and by the structural constraint of 
institutions and powerful actors. However, we seek to 
understand how this happens: what kinds of relation-
ships exist between individual lives, collective beliefs, 
material forces, and the construction of hegemonic 
evidentiary frameworks that drive social reproduc-
tion. We try to give equal relevance to “vernacular” 
and “expert” knowledge and make them both objects 
of research, including our own categories through the 
reflexive method. In the process, however, we force 
vernacular knowledge –often unwillingly—into dif-
ferent logics and abstractions, a form of distancing 
that expresses the scientific mode of knowledge au-
thority where structures of feeling need to become 
structures of reason (Williams 1977; Narotzky 2014). 
Is it possible to escape this dilemma by using differ-
ent knowledges as a method of reciprocally unsettling 
“evidence”? Can we bring “experience” back into fac-
tual relevance while retaining the factual relevance 
of wider social processes that can be empirically as-
sessed, often quantitatively? Experience, evidence, 
and knowledge, all refer to instances of factual truth 
and social facts that are embedded in fields of power 
differentials, geometries of relevance and authority. 
Yet, all along, the stubbornness of facts emerges in its 
multiple forms and questions what it is that we value 
as knowledge.
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